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THE DEMAND FOR CONSUMER CREDIT depends on current prices
of goods and credit, on credit terms, on consumer incomes and
wealth, on expected changes in these factors, and on the time prefer-
ences of consumers—i.e., their preferences for present versus future
consumption. We are concerned here mainly with the credit price
factor.
Consumer response to changes in finance charges is measured by
the related changes in the amount of credit demanded, i.e., the price
elasticity of the demand for credit. The extent to which consumers
take credit cost into account in deciding how much, if any, credit
to use and where to get credit depends, in part, on the form in
which finance charge information is available to them. As seen in
Chapter 2, consumers currently receive such information in differ
ent forms in different sectors of consumer financing. This chapter
deals with the usefulness of these various forms as measures of
credit cost.
Measures of Credit Cost
FINANCE CHARGES IN DOLLARS
Dollar finance charges are relatively easy to adjust for differences
in the quoted prices on goods to be financed or dollar amounts to
be borrowed since all these quantities are expressed in
Their usefulness as a measure of cost is limited, however, to com-
parisons of alternative financing opportunities that have a common
maturity. Consumers who must accept the maximum maturity
available to them in order to secure a monthly payment low enough40 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
for them to purchase a desired commodity can compare dollar
charges and select their lowest cost alternative.1
Dollar finance charges do not provide complete information to
credit users who want to compare the cost of credit for shorter con-
tract maturities with that for longer contract maturities. A po-
tential credit user, for example, will know that it costs him x dol-
lars more to finance a credit contract of thirty-six months' maturity
than one of thirty months' maturity. He must compute an effective
monthly or annual rate on both maturities to discover whether the
added dollars represent a higher, lower, or equal rate of charge.
Dollar charges are also difficult for borrowers to use as a standard
of credit cost when they wish to compare the cost of borrowing
with the return on funds invested in savings accounts, government
bonds, or other interest-yielding liquid assets. For this purpose the
borrower must compute finance charges as an effective annual rate,
the medium usually used in expressing the return or yield on liquid
assets.
SIZE AND NUMBER OF MONTHLY PAYMENTS
Comparison of the size of monthly payments on alternative credit
opportunities is a useful yardstick for credit cost when the number
of payments is the same for a given amount of credit. This limita-
tionis the same as for dollar 'charges. Within this limitation,
monthly payments are superior to dollar charges in one respect,
however. When an alternative credit opportunity for the same ma-
turity offers a lower price for the goods purchased but a higher
dollar finance charge, the monthly payment comparison directly
reveals the more costly alternative.
Monthly payment information is not a useful yardstick for credit
cost when alternative credit opportunities involve different ma-
turities and different amounts of credit. Comparison of credit costs
in such cases requires that monthly payments be converted first to
finance charges in dollars and then to effective monthly or annual
rates. Similarly, monthly payment thta are not useful for comparing
1 The same conclusion holds for consumers who can accept below-maximum-
maturity contracts provided they limit their dollar finance charge comparisons to
contracts having the sa?ne maturity.Uses of Finance Charge Information 41
credit cost with yields on liquid assets•. Here again, dollar charges
must be converted to effective annual rates, the form in which
liquid asset yields are usually quoted.
COMPUTATIONAL RATESOFCHARGE AND COMPUTATIONAL EQUIVALENTS
Add-on, discount, and per cent per month computational rates
(or equivalents) are not useful as a measure of comparative credit
cost when they are all used at the same time by different financing
agencies and sellers. Thus, a 6 per cent annual add-on rate is not
the same as a 6 per cent annual discount rate, and neither is the
same as a monthly rate ofpercent on the unpaid balance. Any
one of these three computational rates (or equivalents) could be a
useful measure of comparative credit cost if all financing agencies
and sellers published rates (or equivalents) based on the same com-
putational method.
Publication of computational rates is not legally acceptable, how-
ever, unless they are also effective rates, for courts generally hold
that any published finance or interest rate should mean an effective
rate. This rules out add-on and discount computational rates, for
neither is an effective rate.
Court decisions against the form of rate quotation used in the
General Motors Acceptance Corporation's 6 per cent add-on plan
are an illustration.2 When the General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration advertised this plan in 1935, it clearly labeled the 6 per cent
add-on rate as follows: "6% a multiplier—not an interest rate." On
the basis of the findings quoted below, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion called the plan an unfair trade practice and enjoined it:
The Commission's findings were that the term "6%," when used in
connection with monthly payments, was understood by the public to mean
6 per cent simple interest per annum computed on the declining balance
as reduced by the monthly payments; but that, as actually carried out,
the purchaser paid 6 per cent, 9 per cent, or 12 per cent, as the case might
be, on the total amount originally owed, until the final payment was made,
resulting in a charge of approximately1per cent simple interest per
annum on an original balance as reduced by monthly payments.
2 See U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, August 12, 1940(114F.
2d 33), and U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, June 5, 1941 (120 F. 2d 175).
3 Annual Report of the Federal Trade .Co,nnzission for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1940, p. 81. The FTC ruling does not apply to banks.42 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
As the quotation indicates, the FTC feared that the 6 per cent
rate would be interpreted as an effective rate which, clearly, it was
not. Consumers who made this interpretation would be led to
underestimate the actual rate of charge.
This possibility of underestimation does not change the fact, how-
ever, that the plan increased the competitive atmosphere among
sellers and financing agencies in 1936. It did so by teaching the bor-
rowing public a simple method of comparing General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation's low-cost borrowing plan with other finance
plans. Through advertisements the public was instructed to deter-
mine the finance charge by adding the unpaid balance and insur-
ance cost and multiplying the sum by 6 per cent for twelve months
or by 6 per cent plus or minuspercent for periods more or less
than twelve months.4
Computational equivalents, i.e., rates of charge in dollars per
$100 of the amount borrowed, are close counterparts of computa-
tional rates and are used mainly as alternatives to add-on and dis-.
count percentage rates. The distinction is nonetheless worth making
for there have been no court rulings on the matter of publishing
computational equivalents.
The legal distinction between add-on (discount) rates and add-on
(discount) equivalents may be a fine one, but distinctions of varying
degrees of fineness exist in all lines of activity. The final determina-
tion of the legality of the distinction rests with legislatures, govern-
ment commissions, and the courts.5
The use of any single type of computational equivalent (or rate)
in quoting credit cost enables consumers to appraise competing
opportunities on the basis of comparative rates of charge. They
still have to value the goods part of their purchases separately from
the credit part and, when the advantages appear to affect one an-
other, must make an adjustment to permit a comparison of the
combined goods and credit cost. In order to compare costs with
liquid-asset yields, computational equivalents (or rates) must either
4 For reproduction of the relevant part of an advertisment, see Robert P.
Shay, "The Price of New-Automobile Financing," Journal of Finance, May 1964,
p. 214. r
5For a discussion of the merits, of different computational methods, see Roland
Stucki, Analysis of instalment Financing Legislation and Practices inUtah,
Salt Lake City, 1956, pp. 26—27.Uses of Finance Charge Information 43
be converted to effective rates or liquid-asset yields must be con-
verted to computational rates.
Computational equivalents (or rates) have an advantage over dol-
lar charge and monthly payment information in that they are a
useful means of comparing credit costs over different time periods.
The add-on and per cent per month methods of computing charges
are more useful than the discount method in this respect, for the
variation in the effective rate equivalents of a given add-on or per
cent per month equivalent (or rate) is small within customary ma-
turity periods. Any given discount equivalent (or rate) involves
progressively higher effective rates as maturities lengthen and, there-
fore, is less satisfactory as measure of cost of contracts on varying
maturities.6
FINANCE RATES
Annual and monthly finance rates provide a common denomina-
tor for determining the cost of all credit transactions, regardless of
size, maturity, or other characteristics. Annual finance rates may be
compared directly with liquid-asset yields. Since monthly finance
rates are approximately one-twelfth of equivalent annual finance
rates, they must be multiplied by twelve for an approximate com-
parison with liquid-asset yields.7
Annual finance rates on small, short-maturity credit contracts are
generally very high even when dollar finance charges are nominal.
They are high because such contracts magnify the importance of
cost elements (particularly acquisition costs) which are independent
of the amount of credit or its maturity. The combination of small
dollar finance charges and extremely high effective annual rates
make it important that dollar charge information supplement ef-
fective annual rate information which, by itself, may be misleading
to prospective borrowers. Conversely, on large loans with long ma-
turities (e.g., mortgages) dollar charge quotation reveals that rela-
tively low effective rates of charge represent substantial dollar
finance charges, approaching or even exceeding the amount bor-
rowed.
Evidence presented below and in Chapter 5 indicates that annual
BSeeAppendix B.
7SeeAppendix A.44 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
finance rates on short- and intermediate-term credit are above the
rates which most consumers believe to be commonly available. The
converse is likely on long-term credit. As noted earlier in the dis-
cussion of dollar finance charges, finance rates, whether monthly
or annual, will not provide, as useful a measure of credit cost as
the comparison of monthly payments on contracts of identical size
and maturity whenever the selling price of the good is changed
by the seller to offset a higher or lower finance charge.
MULTIPLE EFFECTIVE RATES
It is important to distinguish clearly between finance rates and
multiple effective rates. A finance rate is an effective monthly or
annual rate on a credit contract asa whole. Multiple effective rates
are separate (usually two to four) effective monthly or annual rates
on different portions of a given credit balance. As an example, a
given $800 credit contract may have three brackets and three mul-
tiple effective monthly rates as follows: 3 per cent on the bracket
under $200; 2 per cent on the bracket from $200 to $600; and 1
per cent on the bracket from $600 to $800.8
Multiple effective rates have a much more limited usefulness
than finance rates as a measure of credit cost because they do not
give the cost of the contract as..a whole, but rather separate costs of
separate brackets of the contract. They provide a useful measure
only if all financing agencies and sellers shift from one effective
rate to another at identical credit-size intervals and show similar
patterns of variation of effective rates within each credit bracket.
They must be converted to an effective annual rate for comparison
of the credit cost of a contract as a whole with liquid-asset yields.
However, since each multiple effective rate shows the marginal rate
on an additional.amount borrowed, it can be used directly for com-
parison with liquid-asset yields when liquid assets might be used
to reduce the amount of existing debt or to alter the amount bor-
rowed initially.
8 As indicated •in Chapter 2, a number of small-loan laws and a few instal-
inent and industrial loan laws require that financing agencies quote multiple
effective rates in credit contracts.Uses of Finance Charge Information 45
Influence of Finance Charge Information on Consumer Behavior
FINANCE RATE VS. SIZE OF MONTHLY PAYMENT
Considerable attention has been given in the literature to the
effect of changes in finance charges, down payments, maturities, and
size of monthly payments on the amount of credit demanded. In
his 1952 study Avram Kisselgoff the hypothesis that even
significant variations in finance charges are not likely to result in
a significant change in the amount of commodities purchased on
credit.9 In the absence of empirical data, he suggests that this may
be attributable partly to consumer lack of knowledge of the cost of
credit but is "mainly due to the fact that the cyclical changes that
are likely to occur in finance charges are relatively small and can
have very little effect on the amount of the monthly payments." 10
Empirical evidence has not yet firmly established the degree of
cyclical variability of finance charges.1' Thus, the hypothesis that
the demand for credit is little affected by changes in finance charges
came to rest heavily upon the mechanical relationship between
finance charge changes and the size of the monthly payment. A
given percentage change in finance charges causes a much lower
(usually negligible) percentage change in monthly payments. Thus,
raising the add-on rate from 10 to 12 per cent, or by a fifth, on a
twelve-month $300 instalment contract increases the monthly pay-
9 Kisselgoff, factors Affecting the Demand for Consumer instalment
Credit, NBER Technical Paper 7, New York, 1952, p. 18. Along parallel lines,
Gottfried Haberler comments as follows in his 1942 study, "...theview is now
rather generally accepted by economists that the aniount people save is not
much influenced by changes of a few per cent in the rate of interest which can
be earned on savings." (See his Consutner Instalment Credit and Economic Fluc-
tuations, New York, NBER, 1942, p. 35.) For an alternative view, see Martin
J.Bailey, "Saving and the Rate of Interest," Journal of Political Economy,
August 1957, pp. 279—305.
lOIbid., p. 18.
11 Robert P. Shay found that new-auto finance rates moved with open-market
borrowing rates between 1953 and 1959. The rise and fall (in basis points) of
the new-auto series was somewhat less than short-term open-market rates and
somewhat greater than long-term rates. Newauto rates lagged behind the three
cyclical turning points consistently. (See Shay's New-Automobile Finance Rates,
1924—62, NBER Occasional Paper 86, New York, 1963.)— — - w
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ment from $27.50 to $28.00, or less than 2 per cent. Doubling the
add-on rate from 10 to 20 per cent on the same contract increases
the monthly payment less than 10 per cent.
Regulation W, the Federal wartime control of' the volume of
consumer credit, is evidence of belief in consumer insensitivity to
finance charges. It cOntrolled volume by regulating credit terms
(down payments. and maturities) rather than finance charges. This
choice reflects the fact that, in the short run, demand for consumer
credit was thought to be relatively inelastic with respect to finance
charges and sensitive to credit terms. Higher down payments were
expected to deter purchases by consumers who were unable or un-
willing to sacrifice liquidity, and shorter maturities would also be
a deterrent because of the resulting increase in size of the monthly
payment. Thus, reducing maturity by 20 per cent increases monthly
payment size by 25 per cent and cutting maturity in half doubles
monthly payment size.
A 1964 National Bureau study, based on datacollected from a
Consumers Union Members' Panel, attempts to measure the rela-
tivesensitivities of consumer demand for credit to changes in
finance rates and maturities.'2 The sample was divided into sixteen
randomly selected variant groups. Each of thirteen groups was sent
a hypothetical question that specified four alternative ways in
which a stated purchase might be financed. One group was given
three alternatives and two groups were given five alternatives. The
purchase was identical for all groups, an automobile costing $1,500,
after trade-in allowance.
Alternative finance plans consisted of offsetting variations in two
of the following: down payments, monthly payments, maturities,
and finance rates. For fourteen groups there were alternative varia-
tions among down payments, monthly payments, or maturities with
the finance rate held constant. (The finance rate was often different
between groups, however, i.e., 4, 8, or 16 per cent.) Within each of
two groups there were offered alternative variations in finance rates.
Respondents were asked to rank the alternatives in order of prefer-
ence and, to indicate which alternatives were unacceptable.
12Forthe details of this analysis, see F. Thomas Juster and Robert P. Shay,
Consumer Sensitivity to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investiga-
tion, NBER Occasional Paper 88, New York, 1964.— —
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The study uses two approaches to test elasticities of demand with
respect to changes in finance rates and maturities. The traditional
approach assumes that consumer demand for credit is primarily a
function of required monthly payments. "Since monthly payment
size is regarded as the price of the asset, longer maturities with
lowered monthly payments amount to lower prices. A change in
finance rates influences demand only insofar as it changes monthly
payments, holding loan size, downpayment, and maturity constant.
Let us label this the monthly payments model." 13Ifthis approach
is correct, a change in finance rates can only change the demand
for credit through its effect upon monthly payment size.
The second approach, called the marginal borrowing cost model,
assumes that consumer demand for credit is a function of a con-
sumer's marginal rate of return from his investment in assets and
his marginal borrowing cost (borrowing rate). For empirical analysis
consumers are classified as "rationed" or "unrationed." The latter
are those whose marginal borrowing cost is equal to or less than
going finance rates of primary (lower-rate) credit sources (i.e., banks
and sales finance companies). They can borrow additional amounts
at rates about equal to the rates they are paying primary lenders.
Rationed consumers are those whose marginal borrowing cost ex-
ceeds the going rates of primary lenders. They can borrOw addi-
tional amounts only from secondary (higher-rate) credit sources.
"Defined in another way, rationed consumers are those whose aver-
age outstanding debt to primary lenders is less than the amount
they would prefer, given the rates charged, and con-
sumers are those whose actual and preferred debt levels are the
same." 14
Bothmodels have empirically observable implications some of
which are in direct contradiction. The marginal borrowing cost
model predicts that (1) a finance rate rise confined to primary lend-
ers will reduce the borrowing of unrationed consumers and have
no effect on that of rationed consumers and (2) a simultaneous in-
crease in finance rates and maturities will reduce the borrowing of
unratioried consumers and increase that of rationed consumers.
13ibid.,p.17.
14 ibid.,p.:14.48 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
Under this model, consumer response to changes in finance rates
depends on the relative importance of rationed and unrationed
consumers.
The monthly payments model predicts that all consumers will
increase (decrease) borrowing if maturities lengthen (shorten) irre-
spective of rate changes. It also predicts that ".. .theelasticity of
demand for credit with respect to changes in finance rate can be
measured indirectly by the elasticity with respect to changes in
minimum monthly payments. If consumers respond only to changes
in monthly payments, and if a 100 per cent increase in rates in-
creases monthly payments by 10 per cent.. ., theelasticity of de-
mand for credit with respect to rates must be one-tenth the elasticity
with respect to payments." 15 Under this model, •the separate elas-
ticities of demand for credit with respect to finance rates and con-
tract maturities are a function of the proportionate effect of the
changes in each on monthly payment size.'6
Table 5 summarizes elasticities of demand from the responses of
relevant variant groups in the Consumers Union sample. It shows
that the elasticity of demand predicted by the payments model,
when the finance rate is held constant,, varies from —0.058(variant
pairs 10—11), to —0.299(variant pairs 11-44), to —0.172(variant
pairs 10—14). The elasticity based on the largest payment difference
is —0.172and is taken as the most reliable estimate.
The payments elasticity thus estimated, —0.172,is applied to tile dif-
ference in minimum monthly payments between other pairs of variants,
differences that are a consequence, other things being equal, of differences
in the implicit finance rates..
Thisestimate answers the question, how much variation takes place in
what people say they would do as maturities are extended, other things
equal. The four independent comparisons of a similarly hypothetical fi-
nance rate elasticity shown in Table [5] indicate that the response to rate
differences is greater than predicted by the payments model in three of the
four cases, variant pairs 6—8, 14—15, and 13—16. The computed finance rate
elasticity in the fourth case, variant pair 9—12, though is slightly
less than would have been predicted on the basis of the difference in
minimum monthly payments. Averaging the four comparisons: the mean
15 ibid., p. 18.
16 ibid., p. 19.Uses of Finance Charge Information 49
predicted elasticity is —.020;the mean observed elasticity is —.047—more
than double although still quite small in absolute terms.17
TABLE 5
Fraction Accepting One or More Alternative Finance Plans for
Specified Variant Groups, Credit Users Only
Elasticities
Variant Groups No. of
Usable Variant Predicted by
CharacteristicsResponses A Pairs Computed Payments Model No.
: INTEREST (FINANCE) RATECONSTANT(8%)
10 Maximum M24 261 76.6 —.058 nag.
1]. Maximum M—36 252 78.2 11—14 —.299 neg.
14 Maximum M 48 254 84.3 10—14 —.172 nag.
DOWN PAYMENT CONSTANT(0)
14 (i —8%) 254 84.3 14—15 —.098 —.034
15 (i 16%) 252 79.0
8(j 4%) 211 80.6 8—6 —.048 —.029
6 (i 16%) 255 76.1
CONTRACT LENGTh CONSTANT
9(j 4%) 265 81.5 9—1.2 —.005 -.016
12 (i 16%) 248 81.0
MONTUL? PAYMENTS CONSTANT ($65.10)
13 (j — 4%) 246 84.7 13—16 —.036 .000
16 (1 16%) 263 80.2
SOURCE: Juster and Shay, Consumer Sensitivity, p. 29.
NOTE: A =proportionof respondents accepting one or more of the financing
alternatives; M =contractsin months;i=interest(finance) rate.
Juster and Shay believe that the evidence in Table 5 suggests
that the monthly payments model, i.e., the traditional approach,
may underestimate consumer responses to variations in finance
rates. To test this hypothesis further, they divided the sample house-
holds into rationed and unrationed groups on three bases: family
income and marital status, liquid-asset holdings, and attitude to-
17Ibid.,pp. 28—32.The figure —.020is the average of the last four numbers
in the last column of Table 5 and the figure —.047is the average of the last
four numbers in the next to last column.50 ConsumerCredit Finance Charges
TABLE.6
Estimated Finance Rate and Monthly Payment Elasticity of Demand for





Numbers Households Households by Payments Model
A.FAMILY INCOME AND STATUSa
Monthly Payment Elasticities
10—li —.152 +.150 neg.
11—14 —.334 —.420 neg.
10—14 —.231 —.083 neg.
Finance Rate Elasticities
8—6 —.029 —.099 —.029
9—12 —.048 +.l].6 —.016
14—15 —.120 —.235 —.034
13—16 —.044 —.068 .000
Average of four —.060 —.072 —.020
B.LIQUID—ASSET UOLDINGSb
Monthly Payment Elasticities
10—11 +.054 —.114 neg.
11—14 —.155 —.376 neg.
10—14 —.032 —.226 neg.
Finance Rate Elasticities
8—6 +.027 —.051 —.029
9—12 —.091 —.029 —.016
14—15 —.014 —.253 —.034
13—16 +.030 —.080 .000
Average of four —.012 —.103 —.020
C.ATTITUDE TOWARD THEUSEOF CREDITC
Monthly Payment Elasticities
10—li —.020 +.009 neg.
11—14 —.426 —.368 neg.
10—14 —.191 —.148 neg.
Finance Rate Elasticities
8—6 —.024 —.128 —.029
9—12 +.029 —.138 —.016
14—15 —.137 —.276 —.034
13—16 —.014 —.152 .000
Average of four —.036 —.174 —.020
SOURCE:Juster and Shay, Consumer pp. 35, 38, and 41.---- w
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NOTES TO TABLE 6
a
Income After Tax (dollars)
Under 8,000— Over
Marital Status 8,000 10,000 10,000
Married 15 years or less R R -U
Married more than 15 years
or unmarried R U U
(R =rationed,U =unrationed)
b Rationed consumers are those with less than $2,000 in checking accounts,
savings accounts, and savings bonds; unrationed are those with $2,000 or more.
e Rationed consumers were those who indicated they intended to use con-
sumer credit in the future and unrationéd ones were those who indicated they
did not intend to use consumer credit in the future.
ward the use of consumer credit. Table 6 gives the observed elas-
ticities for the rationed and unrationed groups on each of the three
bases and also the elasticities predicted by the payments model.
On all three bases the results are generally more consistent with
the marginal borrowing cost model than with the payments model
as follows: (1) except for the liquid-asset classification, rationed con-
sumers respond more to differences in minimum monthly payments
than do unrationed ones; (2) unrationed consumers are more sensi-
tive to finance rates; (3) for the most part a combination of higher
rates and longer maturities, minimum monthly payments declining
on balance, increases the borrowing of rationed consumers and de-
creases the borrowing of unrationed consumers.18
Juster and Shay conclude that their results "...clearlyindicate
the necessity for qualification of the widely held view that consumer
borrowing decisions are unresponsive to changes in finance rates,
aside from the effect of rate changes on monthly payments. This
generalization appears to be valid for rationed consumers
[but] is not valid for unrationed consumers." 19
18 Ibid., pp. 33—40. The authors attach little importance to the perverse be-
havior of the monthly payments elasticities in the liquid-asset classification in
Table 6. They attribute it to the choice Of $2,000 as a cutting point so that
"the sample sizes in the rationed group are quite small and the sampling errors
correspondingly large."
19 Ibid., p. 45. Since the elasticities in Table 5 are not statistically significant,
Juster and Shay point out that neither group's elasticity of demand with respect
to finance rate changes is large in an absolute sense, but only that the unra-
tioned group's elasticity is relatively larger—more than doubk that of the ra-
tioned group (ibid., p. 32).52 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
A majority of the households in the Consumers Union sample
and an even larger proportion of the population are probably in
the rationed category. Several factors suggest that has been a
shift of borrowers from the rationed to the unrationed category over
the past several decades and that the shift will continue in the fu-
ture. One is the tendency for lenders to lengthen maturities for the
same quality of borrower. The other is the secular growth of in-
comes and wealth. "On both counts, we may expect consumers to
be relatively more responsive to variations in finance rates in the
future than at present, and also to be more responsive at present
than they had been in earlier decades." 20 As the number of con-
sumers in the unrationed category grows, the greater is the useful-
ness of finance rates in influencing consumer borrowing decisions
on credit contracts of different maturities.
Juster and Shay also find that "responses to rate differences were
substantially stronger when finance rates were specified for borrow-
ers than when identical rates of charge were unspecified, although
implied by payment details." 21 They note, too, that response to
specified finance rates was greater when finance rates are high than
when they are low. These responses may have some upward bias.
For many respondents believe finance rates to be lower than they
are and thus may have rejected high specified rates by mistakenly
believing that lower cost alternatives are available to them in. the
USE OF DEBT VS. LIQUID ASSETS
As noted earlier in this chapter, special problems of rate quota-
tion arise for consumers who have liquid assets at the time they
incur debt. To what extent are such consumers willing to use liquid
assets as a partial or complete substitute for debt? To what extent
would their decisions be affected by a more precise knowledge of
finance rates?
20 Ibid., p. 46. The authors note the possibility that increased responsiveness
could be offset to the extent that consumer wants expand with rising incomes,
wealth, and access to credit.
21 Ibid., p. 75.
22 ibid., p. 75.Uses of Finance Charge Information 53
Except for demand deposits and cash, liquid assets usually bring
in pecuniary income to their owners. Rates of return on income-
bearing liquid assets are generally expressed as effective annual in-
terest rates or yields. The compounding intervals used in determining
these rates vary according to the nature of the credit or deposit
agreement and are, in the main, a quarter, a half year, or a year.
The analysis of Juster and Shay referred to above suggests that
consumers with liquid assets of $2,000 and over have a greater
elasticity of demand for consumer credit with respect to changes in
finance rates than consumers with liquid assets of $2,000 or less.23
A November 1959 survey of the Survey Research Center provides in-
formation on consumer attitudes toward the concurrent holding of
liquid assets and debt. A number of consumers were asked their
opinions on why a person buys a car on time even though he has
sufficient money (savings) in the bank to pay cash. As Table 7 in-
dicates, 68 per cent give what may be termed positive reasons for
such behavior: 56 per cent state that he is earmarking his cash for
other purposes and 12 per cent state that he is gaining in some way
by using the credit. Less than 7 per cent give derogatory reasons for
such behavior. In describing such a person, 52 per cent use flatter-
ing adjectives such as intelligent and informed and 17 per cent use
unflattering adjectives such as stupid and foolish. Thus, on balance,
consumers view holding debt and liquid assets coicurrently as
rational behavior.
In an earlier, essentially deductive treatment of the same prob-
lem, Haberler says: "Those who incur instalment debt in spite of
the fact that they possess liquid assets must have strong reasons for
not using these assets for the purchase of goods. Instalment credit
is expensive." 24Headvances the following as possible reasons: (1)
consumers may consider liquid assets as long-term assets to be held
for long-term purposes; (2) they may lack confidence in •their will
power to replace any liquid assets which are liquidated; and (3)
liquidating liquid assets may involve costs or loss of potential
23ibid.,pp. 36—38.
24 Haberler,Consumer Instalment Credit, p. 44.54 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
profit.25 His first two reasons closely parallel the first two reasons
given in Table 7.
TABLE 7






(second question) of Replies
To keep bank account Intelligent; informed;
for emergencies intact 42 plans ahead 30
Difficulty of replacing Cautious; conservative 11
savings 5 Wise guy; smart; shrewd 11
Cash wanted for some— 52
thing else 9
56
To establish credit 6 .
Better service; better
price 5 .
Use of car while paying 1 .
12
Only derogatory state— Stupid; unwise;foolish;
ments; no reason 7 crazy
Does not calculate; not








Other; don't know; not Other; average; ordinary;
ascertained 25 know; not ascer—
tamed 31
Total 100 100
SOURCE: November 1959 Interim Survey of the Survey Research Center of the
University of Michigan. The questions asked consumers were: "Speaking of buy-
ing a car on time, Mr. Smith has just done so although he has enough money
in the bank to pay cash. Why do you think he bought the care on time? What
kind of a man is he?"
Philip Klein's National Bureau study of financial adjustments
to unemployment indicates that the two most frequently used tech-
niques of adjusting financially to unemployment were to decrease
saving.s and checking accounts (liquid assets) and to borrow money:
40 per cent of the 1,836 households which experienced unemploy-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































056 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
ment technique and 26 per cent borrowed money.26 'This indicates
that liquid assets are important in maintaining consumption and
credit standing in an emergency such as unemployment. This li-
quidity value possessed by liquid assets (mentioned by 42 per cent
of the replies in Table 7) may well compensate. in the minds of
many persons, for a substantial diffeience between the earnings rate
on liquid assets and the finance rate on credit.
The Survey Research Center data provide no direct evidence on
the extent to which consumers might use liquid assets as a partial
or full substitute for instalment debt if they knew finance rates.
Indirect evidence is inconclusive but may be mentioned to give
some perspective on the practical importance of the problem. Table
8 shows that, in early 1959, 43 per cent of all spending units sur-
veyed had both personal debt and liquid assets: 19 per cent had
liquid assets in excess of personal debt and 23 per cent had liquid-
asset holdings which were less than their personal debt. Further-
more, those with liquid assets in excess of debt were relatively num-
erous in all but the lowest income groups. These facts mean that
(1) roughly one-third of spending unitswith debt could have elim-
inated their entire personal. debt had they chosen to substitute li-
quid assets for debt, (2) an additional one-third of those spending
units with debt could have reduced their debt by substituting liquid
assets, and (3) liquidation of debt could have been distributed
widely among income groups.
Tables 8 and 9 give some support to the inference that the dollar
decrease in personal debt would have been substantial if all spending
units with personal debt and liquid assets in early 1959 had
•stituted assets for debt. The top four income groups contained (1)
44 per cent of all spending units (Table 9), (2) the highest percent-
ages of spending units with personal debt (Table 8), (3) the highest
percentages (25 per cent or more) of units with liquid as-
sets in excess of personal debt '(Table 8),. (4) the highest percentages
of spending units with personal debt of $200 and over (Table 9),
and (5) the highest percentages of spending units with liquid assets
26 Philip A. Klein, Financial Adjustments to Unemployment, NBER Occa-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
of $200 and over (Table 9).27Aconsiderable number of the spend-
ing units in each of. the four top income groups had both debt and
liquid assets in excess of $200, for the combined percentages exceed
100, successively, as follows: 113, 129, 142,, 137 (Table 9).
Since a substantial proportion of debt owed by ,spending 'units
with liquid assets appears to be in the income groups of $5,000 and
over, increased knowledge of finance rates wouldhave the greatest,
chance of influencing a 'substitution of liquid assets for debt to the
extent that an upward revision of their credit cost estimate made
it appear desirable to hold fewer assets and borrow less.
Yet it is important to know both the absolute number as well as the
proportion of borrowers with incomes above $5,000 who are misin-
formed. All borrowers have the option of' not making a given pur-
chase when costs appear to be higher. Borrowers with liquid assets
have the additional option of borrowing less and still making the
purchase;
Unfortunately, our data do not permit even an approximate
estimate of the number of consumers who may be misinformed.
Table 10 does, however, shed some light on problem, for it.
shows that, when asked what interest or carrying charges one has
to pay for buying a car on time, 40 to 48 per cent of the spending
units in income groups of $5,000 and over gave' answers which led
to computed effective annual rates under 7 per cent. Spending units
in these income groups contained about 29 per cent of all spending
units with personal debt and about 27 per cent of all spending
units with both personal debt and liquid assets in 1959.28 Only 5
27The$10,000 and over group is an exception in points (2) and (4).
28Thesepercentages are computed from Tables 8 and 9 as follows:
Percentage of Spending Units in Each Group with
Income
'%of AllPersonalPersonal Debt &Cols. Cols.
Group SpendingUnitsDebt Liquid Assets 1 x 2 1 x 3
(dollars) .(1) '(2) (3) (4) (5)
5,000—5,999 12 '70 59 8.4 7.1
6,000—7,499 12 71 65 8.5 7.8
7,500—9,999 , 12 69 65 8.3 7.8
10,000 and over 8 49 ' 49 , 4.1 3.9
Percentage of all spending units with:
Personal debt '29.8



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































:60 Consumer Credit Finance Charges
per cent of new-car instalment contracts were financed at effective
annual rates of 6 per cent or less in 1954—55. Judging solely from
the large sales finance company's figures in Table 10, an even lower
percentage of new-car contracts were probably financed at rates of
under 7 per cent in 1959.
Interpretation of the responses in Table 10 as effective annual
rates lends support to the inference that a not inconsiderable num-
ber of spending Units with both liquid assets and personal debt have
some misconception of the finance rates they are paying. Interpre-
tation of the responses in Table 10 as computational annual rates
does not lend support to such an inference. Unfortunately, there
is no way to choose between the two interpretations, for the survey
did not ascertain which interpretation respondents had in mind
in giving their answers.
Yet even if it were possible to measure the number of persons
who were misinformed about finance rates, the crucial questions of
the effects of acquiring accurate information would remain. How
urgent are the purchases which might be foregone if consumers'
estimates of credit cost rise? How many persons would find that
knowledge of finance rates would cause them to liquidate assets
and curtail borrowing?
The evidence reviewed supports the general notion that a num-
ber of people use instalment buying. as a budgetary device. Many
èonsumers feel that they lack the necessary fortitude to save ahead
and buy for cash and that instalment buying gives them better dis-
cipline in handling finances. It is likely that many consumers place
a high value on keeping liquid assets intact for other purposes;
finance rate information might merely provide a simple way to
measure the relative costs when borrowing rates are made compar-
able to rates paid for savings.